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Abstract
Teachers intentionally pick the most informative
examples to show their students. However, if the
teacher and student are neural networks, the ex-
amples that the teacher network learns to give,
although effective at teaching the student, are typ-
ically uninterpretable. We show that training the
student and teacher iteratively, rather than jointly,
can produce interpretable teaching strategies. We
evaluate interpretability by (1) measuring the sim-
ilarity of the teacher’s emergent strategies to intu-
itive strategies in each domain and (2) conducting
human experiments to evaluate how effective the
teacher’s strategies are at teaching humans. We
show that the teacher network learns to select or
generate interpretable, pedagogical examples to
teach rule-based, probabilistic, boolean, and hier-
archical concepts.
1. Introduction
Human teachers give informative examples to help their
students learn concepts faster and more accurately (Shafto
et al., 2014; Shafto & Goodman, 2008; Buchsbaum et al.,
2011). For example, suppose a teacher is trying to teach
different types of animals to a student. To teach what a
“dog” is they would not show the student only images of
dalmatians. Instead, they would show different types of
dogs, so the student generalizes the word “dog” to all types
of dogs, rather than merely dalmatians.
Teaching through examples can be seen as a form of com-
munication between a teacher and a student. Recent work
on learning emergent communication protocols in deep-
learning based agents has been successful at solving a vari-
ety of tasks (Foerster et al., 2016; Sukhbaatar et al., 2016;
Mordatch & Abbeel, 2017; Das et al., 2017; Lazaridou et al.,
2016). Unfortunately, the protocols learned by the agents are
usually uninterpretable to humans (Kottur et al., 2017). In-
terpretability is important for a variety of reasons (Caruana
et al., 2017; Doshi-Velez & Kim, 2017), including safety,
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trust, and in this case, potential for use in communication
with humans.
We hypothesize that one reason the emergent protocols are
uninterpretable is because the agents are typically optimized
jointly. Consider how this would play out with a teacher
network T that selects or generates examples to give to a
student network S. If T and S are optimized jointly, then T
and S essentially become an encoder and decoder that can
learn any arbitrary encoding. T could encode “dog” through
a picture of a giraffe and encode “siamese cat” through a
picture of a hippo.
The examples chosen byT, although effective at teaching S,
are unintuitive since S does not learn in the way we expect.
On the other hand, picking diverse dog images to communi-
cate the concept of “dog” is an intuitive strategy because it
is the effective way to teach given how we implicitly assume
a student would interpret the examples. Thus, we believe
that S having an interpretable learning strategy is key to the
emergence of an interpretable teaching strategy.
This raises the question of whether there is an alternative
to jointly optimizing T and S, in which S maintains an
interpretable learning strategy, and leads T to learn an in-
terpretable teaching strategy. We would ideally like such an
alternative to be domain-agnostic. Drawing on inspiration
from the cognitive science work on rational pedagogy (see
Section 2.1), we propose a simple change:
1. Train S on random examples
2. Train T to pick examples for this fixed S
In Step 1, S learns an interpretable strategy that exploits
a natural mapping between concepts and examples, which
leads T to learn an interpretable teaching strategy in Step 2.
What do we mean by interpretable? There is no universally
agreed upon definition of interpretability (Doshi-Velez &
Kim, 2017; Weller, 2017; Lipton, 2016). Rather than simply
picking one definition, we operationalize interpretability us-
ing the following two metrics in the hopes of more robustly
capturing what we mean by interpretable:
1. Evaluating how similar T’s strategy is to intuitive
human-designed strategies (Section 5)
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2. Evaluating how effective T’s strategy is at teaching
humans (Section 6)
We find that, according to these metrics, T learns to give
interpretable, pedagogical examples to teach rule-based,
probabilistic, boolean, and hierarchical concepts.
2. Related Work
2.1. Rational pedagogy
What does it mean to rationally teach and learn through
examples? One suggestion is that a rational teacher chooses
the examples that are most likely to make the student infer
the correct concept. A rational student can then update their
prior belief of the concept given the examples and the fact
that the examples were chosen by a cooperative teacher.
Shafto et al formalize this intuition in a recursive Bayesian
model of human pedagogical reasoning (Shafto & Good-
man, 2008; Shafto et al., 2012; 2014). In their model the
probability a teacher selects an example e to teach a concept
c is a soft maximization (with parameter α) over what the
student’s posterior probability of c will be. The student can
then update their posterior accordingly. This leads to two
recursive equations:
Pteacher(e|c) ∝ (Pstudent(c|e))α (1)
Pstudent(c|e) ∝ Pteacher(e|c)P (c) (2)
Note that in general there are many possible solutions to
this set of dependent equations. A sufficient condition for
a unique solution is an initial distribution for Pteacher(e|c).
Shafto et al suggest that a natural initial distribution for the
teacher is a uniform distribution over examples consistent
with the concept. They empirically show that the fixed point
that results from this initial distribution matches human
teaching strategies.
In our work, we initialize the teacher distribution in the way
suggested by Shafto et al. We optimize in two steps: (1)
train the student on this initial distribution of examples (2)
optimize the teacher for this fixed student. This approach
is analogous to doing one iteration of Equation 2 and then
one iteration of Equation 1. We find that one iteration is
sufficient for producing interpretable strategies.
2.2. Communication protocol learning.
Teaching via examples can be seen as communication be-
tween a teacher to a student via examples. Much recent
work has focused on learning emergent communication pro-
tocols in deep-learning based agents (Foerster et al., 2016;
Sukhbaatar et al., 2016). However, these emergent protocols
tend to be uninterpretable (Kottur et al., 2017). A number of
techniques have been suggested to encourage interpretabil-
ity, such as limiting symbol vocabulary size (Mordatch &
Abbeel, 2017), limiting memorization capabilities of the
speaker (Kottur et al., 2017), or introducing auxiliary tasks
such as image labelling based on supervision data (Lazari-
dou et al., 2016).
Despite these modifications, the protocols can still be diffi-
cult to interpret. Moreover, it is unclear how modifications
like limiting vocabulary size apply when communication
is in the form of examples because usually examples are
already a fixed length (e.g coordinates in a plane) or con-
strained to be selected from a set of possible examples. So,
there must be other reasons that humans come up with inter-
pretable protocols in these settings, but neural networks do
not.
We suggest that one reason may be that these communica-
tion protocols are typically learned through joint optimiza-
tion of all agents (Foerster et al., 2016; Sukhbaatar et al.,
2016; Mordatch & Abbeel, 2017; Kottur et al., 2017; Lazari-
dou et al., 2016), and evaluate how changing from a joint
optimization to an iterative one can improve interpretability.
2.3. Interpretability in machine teaching.
One problem studied in the machine teaching literature is
finding a student-teacher pair such that the student can learn
a set of concepts when given examples from the teacher
(Jackson & Tomkins, 1992; Balbach & Zeugmann, 2009).
However, it is difficult to formalize this problem in a way
that avoids contrived solutions known as “coding tricks.” Al-
though the community has not agreed on a single definition
of what a coding trick is, it refers to a solution in which
the teacher and student simply “collude” on a pre-specified
protocol for encoding the concept through examples.
Many additional constraints to the problem have been pro-
posed to try to rule out coding tricks. These additional
constraints include requiring the student to be able to learn
through any superset of the teacher’s examples (Goldman
& Mathias, 1996), requiring the learned protocols to work
for any ordering of the concepts or examples (Zilles et al.,
2011), requiring the student to learn all concepts plus their
images under primitive recursive operators (Ott & Stephan,
2002), and giving incompatible hypothesis spaces to the
student and teacher (Angluin & Krik¸is, 1997).
The prior work has mainly been theoretically driven. The
papers provide a definition for what it means to avoid collu-
sion and then aim to find student-teacher pairs that provably
satisfy the proposed definition. Our work takes a more
experimental approach. We provide two criteria for inter-
pretability and then empirically evaluate how modifying the
optimization procedure affects these two criteria.
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Figure 1. A visualization of the interaction between T and S. At
each step T takes in the true concept and S’s last estimate of the
concept and outputs an example for S. Then S outputs its new
estimate of the concept.
Algorithm 1 Joint Optimization
Require: p(C): distribution over concepts
while not converged do
Sample c1, . . . cn ∼ p(C)
for each ci do
Initialize cˆi,0 = 0
for k ∈ {1, ...,K} do
ek = T(ci, cˆi,k−1|θT)
cˆi,k = S(ek|θS)
end for
end for
θS = θS − 1n∇θS
∑
i
∑
k L(ci, cˆi,k)
θT = θT − 1n∇θT
∑
i
∑
k L(ci, cˆi,k)
end while
3. Approach
We consider a set of possible concepts C and examples E .
For example, C may be different animals like cats, dogs,
parrots, etc and E may be images of those animals. The
prior p(e|c) is a distribution over non-pedagogically selected
examples of the concept. For example, if C is the set of all
animals, then p(e|c) could be a uniform distribution over
images of a given animal.
A student S : E 7→ C takes in a running sequence of K
examples and at each step outputs a guess cˆ for the concept
the sequence of examples corresponds to. A teacher T :
C × C 7→ E takes in the target concept to teach and S’s
current guess of the concept and outputs the next example
for the student at each step. When the set of examples
is continuous T outputs the examples directly. When E is
discrete we use the Gumbel-Softmax trick (Jang et al., 2016)
to have T generate a sample from E .
The performance of both S and T is evaluated by a loss
function L : C × C 7→ R that takes in the true concept and
S’s output after K examples (although in some tasks we
found it useful to sum the losses over all S’s outputs). In our
Algorithm 2 Best Response (BR) Optimization
Require: p(C): distribution over concepts
Train student on random examples:
while not converged do
Sample c1, . . . cn ∼ p(C)
for each ci do
for k ∈ {1, ...,K} do
ek ∼ p(·|ci)
cˆi,k = S(ek|θS)
end for
end for
θS = θS − 1n∇θS
∑
i
∑
k L(ci, cˆi,k)
end while
Train teacher best response to student:
while not converged do
Sample c1, . . . cn ∼ p(C)
for each ci do
Initialize cˆi,0 = 0
for k ∈ {1, ...,K} do
ek = T(ci, cˆi,k−1|θT)
cˆi,k = S(ek|θS)
end for
end for
θT = θT − 1n∇θT
∑
i
∑
k L(ci, cˆi,k)
end while
work, both S and T are modeled with deep recurrent neural
networks parameterized by θS and θT, respectively. Recur-
rent memory allows the student and teacher to effectively
operate over sequences of examples. T and S are illustrated
graphically in Figure 1.
In the recent work on learning deep communication pro-
tocols, the standard way to optimize S and T would be to
optimize them jointly, similar to the training procedure of an
autoencoder (Algorithm 1). However, joint optimization al-
lows S andT to form an arbitrary, uninterpretable encoding
of the concept via examples. We compare joint optimiza-
tion to an alternative approach we call a best response (BR)
optimization (Algorithm 2), which iteratively trains S and
T in two steps:
1. Train S on concept examples e1, . . . eK ∼ p(·|c) com-
ing from prior example distribution.
2. Train T to select or generate examples for the fixed S
from Step 1.
The intuition behind separating the optimization into two
steps is that if S learns an interpretable learning strategy in
Step 1, then T will be forced to learn an interpretable teach-
ing strategy in Step 2. 1 The reason we expect S to learn an
1We also explored doing additional best responses, but this did
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“interpretable” strategy in Step 1 is that it allows S to learn a
strategy that exploits the natural mapping between concepts
and examples. For example, suppose the concept space is
the set of all rectangles and p(e|c) is a uniform distribution
over points within a rectangle (the task in Section 5.1). In
Step 1, S learns to only guess rectangles that contain all the
given examples. Because S expects examples to be within
the rectangle, then in Step 2,T learns to only give examples
that are within the rectangle, without explicitly being con-
strained to do so. So,T learns to picks the most informative
examples that are still within the rectangle, which are the
corners of the rectangle.
4. Tasks
The purpose of our experiments is to examine what kind of
emergent teaching strategies T learns and whether or not
they are interpretable. However, there are many definitions
of interpretability in the literature (Doshi-Velez & Kim,
2017; Weller, 2017; Lipton, 2016). Rather than selecting
just one, we evaluate interpretability in two ways, hoping
that together these evaluations more robustly capture what
we mean by interpretability. We evaluate interpretability by:
1. Evaluating how similar T’s strategies are to intuitive
human-designed strategies in each task
2. Evaluating the effectiveness ofT’s strategy at teaching
humans.
We created a variety of tasks for evaluation that capture a
range of different types of concepts (rule-based, probabilis-
tic, boolean, and hierarchical concepts). In this section we
provide a brief description of the tasks and why we chose
them. Section 5 evaluates our method with respect to the
first interpretability criteria, while Section 6 addresses the
second interpretability criteria.
Rule-based concepts. We first aimed to replicate a com-
mon task in the rational pedagogy literature in cognitive
science, known as the rectangle game (Shafto & Goodman,
2008). In the variant of the rectangle game that we consider,
there is a rectangle that is known to the teacher but unknown
to the student. The student’s goal is to infer the boundary of
the rectangle from examples of points within the rectangle.
The intuitive strategy that human teachers tend to use is to
pick opposite corners of the rectangle (Shafto et al., 2012;
2014). We find that T learns to match this strategy.
Probabilistic concepts. It is often difficult to define
naturally-occurring concepts via rules. For example, it
not increase interpretability compared to just one best response. In
addition, we explored optimizing S andT jointly after pre-training
S with Step 1, but this did not lead to more interpretable protocols
than directly training jointly.
is unclear how to define what a bird is via logical rules.
Moreover, some examples of a concept can seem more pro-
totypical than others (e.g sparrow vs peacock) (Rosch &
Mervis, 1975), and this is not captured by simply modeling
the concept as a set of rules that must be satisfied. An alter-
native approach models concept learning as estimating the
probability density of the concept (Anderson, 1991; Ashby
& Alfonso-Reese, 1995; Fried & Holyoak, 1984; Griffiths
et al., 2008).
(Shafto et al., 2014) investigate teaching and learning uni-
modal distributions. But often a concept (e.g lamp) can
have multiple subtypes (e.g. desk lamp and floor lamp).
So, we investigate how T teaches a bimodal distribution.
The bimodal distribution is parameterized as a mixture of
two Gaussian distributions and S’s goal is to learn the loca-
tion of the modes. T learns the intuitive strategy of giving
examples at the two modes.
Boolean concepts. An object can have many properties,
but only a few of them may be relevant for deciding whether
the object belongs to a concept or not. For example, a circle
is a circle whether it has a radius of 5 centimeters or 100
meters. The purpose of this task is to see what strategy T
learns to quickly teach S which properties are relevant to a
concept.
The possible examples we consider are images that vary
based on four properties: size (small, medium, large), color
(red, blue, green), shape (square vs circle), and border (solid
vs none). Figure 7 shows possible example images. Only
one to three of these properties define a concept. For exam-
ple, if the concept is red circles, then red circles of any size
or border fit the concept.
T learns the intuitive strategy of picking two examples
whose only common properties are the ones required by
the concept, allowing S to learn that the other properties are
not relevant for membership in the concept.
Hierarchical concepts. Human-defined concepts are of-
ten hierarchical, e.g. animal taxonomies. Humans are sen-
sitive to taxonomical structure when learning how to gen-
eralize to a concept from an example (Xu & Tenenbaum,
2007). The purpose of this task is to test how T learns
to teach when the concepts form a hierarchical structure.
We create hierarchical concepts by pruning subtrees from
Imagenet. T’s goal is to teach S nodes from any level in
the hierarchy, but can only give images from leaf nodes. T
learns the intuitive strategy of picking two examples whose
lowest common ancestor is the concept node, allowing S to
generalize to the correct level in the hierarchy.
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Joint Teacher
Figure 2. Rule-based concepts. The black rectangle is the ground-truth concept and the blue dashed rectangle is student’s output after
each example. Left: The joint optimization has no clear interpretable strategy. Right: Under BR optimization T learns to give opposite
corners of the rectangle.
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Figure 3. Rule-based concepts. T’s examples are closer to opppo-
site corners of the rectangles than randomly generated or jointly
trained examples.
5. Evaluation: Strategy Similarity
First, we evaluate interpretability by evaluating how similar
the strategy T learns is to an intuitive, human-designed
strategy for each task.
5.1. Rule-based concepts
A concept (rectangle) is encoded as a length four vector
c ∈ [−10, 10]4 of the minimum x, minimum y, maximum
x, and maximum y of the rectangle. p(e|c) is a uniform
distribution over points in the rectangle. Examples are two-
dimensional vectors that encode the x and y coordinate of a
point. The loss between the true concept c and S’s output
c′ is L(c, cˆ) = ||c − cˆ||22 and is only calculated on S’s last
output. S is first trained against ten examples generated
from p(e|c). Then T is trained to teach S in two examples.
T generates examples continuously as a two-dimensional
vector.
Figure 2 shows an example of T’s choices and S’s guess
of the concept after each example given. Under both BR
and joint optimization S is able to infer the concept in two
examples. However, in joint optimization it is not clear how
T’s examples relate to the ground-truth rectangle (black)
or what policy the student (orange) has for inferring the
rectangle. On the other hand, in the BR case T outputs
points close to opposite corners of the rectangle, and S
expands its estimate of the rectangle to fit the examples the
teacher gives.
Figure 3 measures the distance between the random, best
response (teacher), and joint strategy to the intuitive strategy
of giving corners averaged over concepts. Specifically, let
e = (e1, e2) be the two examples given and S(c) be the set
of tuples of opposite corners of c. The distance measures
how close these two examples are to a pair of opposite
corners and is defined as d(e, c) = mins∈S(c) ||e1 − s1||2 +
||e2 − s2||2. T’s examples are much closer to opposite
corners than either the random or joint strategy.
5.2. Probabilistic concepts
A concept is encoded as two-dimensional vector c =
(µ1, µ2) ∈ [0, 20]2 where µ1 and µ2 are the locations of
the two modes and µ1 < µ2. p(e|c) = 0.5N (µ1, 1) +
0.5N (µ2, 1) is a mixture of two Gaussians. The loss be-
tween the true concept c and S’s output cˆ is L(c, cˆ) =
||c− cˆ||22. S is first trained against five examples generated
from p(e|c). Then T is trained to teach S in two examples.
T generates examples continuously as a one-dimensional
vector.
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Figure 4. Probabilistic concepts. T picks examples at different modes more consistently than the random policy, which picks examples
near the same mode half of the time. Example are visualized by length of lines.
Di
st
an
ce
 to
   
   
   
   
In
tu
iti
ve
 S
tra
te
gy
0
2
4
6
8
Random Teacher Joint
Figure 5. Probabilistic concepts. T’s examples are closer to the
two modes than randomly generated or jointly trained examples.
T learns the intuitive strategy of giving the two modes as
the examples. Figure 5 measures the distance to the intuitive
strategy by the distance, ||e− c||2, between the examples,
e, and the true modes, c. Both e and c are sorted when
calculating the distance. T learns to match the intuitive
strategy better than the random or joint strategy.
Figure 4 shows an example of the choices of the random,
teacher, and joint strategy. While the random strategy some-
times picks two examples closer to one mode, T is more
consistent about picking examples at two of the modes (as
indicated by Figure 5). It is unclear how to interpret the
choices from the joint strategy.
5.3. Boolean concepts
Examples are images of size 25 x 25 x 3. Concepts are
ten-dimensional binary vectors where each dimension rep-
resents a possible value of a property (size, color, shape,
border). The value of one in the vector indicates that the
relevant property (e.g. color) must take on that value (e.g.
red) in order to be considered a part of the concept. p(e|c)
is a uniform distribution over positive examples of the con-
cept. The loss between the true concept c and S’s output cˆ is
L(c, cˆ) = ||c− cˆ||22. S is first trained on five examples gen-
erated from p(e|c). In both BR and joint optimization, we
trained S with a curriculum starting with concepts defined
by three properties, then two, and then one. T is trained
to teach S with two examples. In this experiment, T se-
Random Teacher
Figure 6. Boolean concepts. Examples for the concept “red”. Left:
The concept “red with border” and “red” are consistent with the
random examples. Right: Only the true concept “red” is consistent
with T’s examples.
Figure 7. Boolean concepts. Possible example images.
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Figure 8. Boolean concepts. T matches the intuitive strategy 87%
of the time, compared to 36% for random, and 0% for joint.
lects an example from a discrete set of all images. We use
the Gumbel-Softmax estimator (Jang et al., 2016) to select
discrete examples from final layer of T in a differentiable
manner.
T learns the intuitive strategy of picking two examples
whose only common properties are the ones required by
the concept, so that S can rule out the auxiliary properties.
For example, Figure 6 shows T’s examples for the concept
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Ape
Lesser apeGreat ape
Siamang Gibbon
ChimpanzeeGorilla
…
Orangutan
…
Figure 9. Hierarchical concepts. An example subtree. T’s strategy
is to give two nodes whose lowest common ancestor is the target
concept. For example, to teach ape T could choose to give an
orangutan image and a siamang image.
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Figure 10. Hierarchical concepts. T learns to perfectly match the
intuitive strategy for hierarchical concepts, but the joint optimiza-
tion matches the intuitive strategy less than random examples.
of red. T selects a large red square with no border and then
a small red circle with a border. The only property the two
shapes have in common is red, so the concept must only
consist of red. Indeed, 87% of T’s examples only have the
required properties in common, compared to 36% of ran-
dom examples, and 0% of jointly trained examples (Figure
8).
5.4. Hierarchical concepts
We create a set of hierarchical concepts by pruning a subtree
from Imagenet. Each node in the subtree is a concept and is
encoded as a one-hot vector. We randomly select 10 images
of each leaf node. The possible examples for a leaf node
are any of its ten images. The possible examples for an
interior node are images from any of its descendant leaves.
For example, in the hierarchy of apes shown in Figure 9, the
possible examples for the “lesser apes” concept are images
of siamangs or gibbons.
We use a pretrained ResNet-50 model (He et al., 2015)
to embed each image into a 2048 length vector. p(e|c) is
a uniform distribution over the possible examples for the
concept. L(c, cˆ) is the softmax cross entropy loss between
the true concept c and S’s output cˆ. S is first trained on five
examples generated from p(e|c). T then learns to teach S
with two examples. As in 5.3, the final layer of T uses the
Gumbel-Softmax estimator to sample an example image.
T learns the intuitive strategy of picking examples from two
leaf nodes such that the lowest common ancestor (LCA) of
the leaf nodes is the concept node. This strategy encodes
the intuition that to teach someone the concept “dog” you
wouldn’t only show them images of dalmations. Instead
you would show examples of different types of dogs, so they
generalize to a higher level in the taxonomy. For example, to
teach what an ape isT could select an image of an orangutan
and a siamang because the lowest common ancestor of the
two is the ape concept (Figure 9).
Figure 10 showsT’s correspondence to the intuitive strategy
on the interior nodes of three example subtrees of Imagenet:
apes, parrots, and felines. These subtrees have 16, 19, and
57 possible concepts respectively. T learns to follow the
LCA strategy 100% of the time, whereas the highest the
jointly trained strategy ever gets is 20%.
6. Evaluation: Teaching Humans
In the previous section, we evaluated interpretability by
measuring how similar T’s strategy was to a qualitatively
intuitive strategy for each task. In this section, we revisit
two of the tasks and provide an additional measure of in-
terpretability by evaluating how effective T’s strategy is at
teaching humans.
6.1. Probabilistic concepts
We ran experiments to see how well T could teach humans
the bimodal distributions task from Section 5.2. 60 sub-
jects were recruited on Amazon Mehcanical Turk. They
were tested on the ten concepts with modes in E =
{4, 8, 12, 16, 20}. 30 subjects were shown two examples
generated from p(e|c) for each concept and the other 30
subjects were shown two examples generated by T for each
concept. The subjects were then given five test lines of
lengths in E and asked to rate on a scale of one to five how
likely they think the line is a part of the concept. For each
concept there were two lines with very high probability of
being in the concept and three lines with very low probabil-
ity of being in the concept. A subject is said to have gotten
the concept correct if they gave the high-probability lines
a rating greater than three and the low-probability lines a
rating less than or equal to three.
The subjects given examples from the teacher had an average
accuracy of 18%, compared to 8% with random examples.
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Figure 11. Probabilistic concepts. Humans learned the correct
distribution over concepts better than humans given random exam-
ples.
Ac
cu
ra
cy
0%
50%
100%
Random Teacher
p < 0.001
Figure 12. Boolean concepts. Humans learned to classify test im-
ages better through examples from T.
In addition, the teacher group had a much higher standard
deviation than the random group, 19% compared to 6%. The
maximum accuracy in the teacher group was 70%, but just
20% in the random group. The difference between groups
was highly significant with p < 0.001, calculated using a
likelihood-ratio test on an ordinary logit model as described
in (Jaeger, 2008).
Although the teacher group did better, neither group had a
high mean accuracy. The task is difficult because a subject
needs to get the entire distribution correct to be counted
as a correct answer. But another possible reason for poor
performance is people may have had the wrong hypothesis
about the structure of concepts. It seems as though many
subjects hypothesized that the structure of the concept space
was unimodal, rather than bimodal, thus believing that lines
with a length in between the two shown to them were very
likely to be a part of the concept. An interesting open
research question is how to ensure that the human has the
correct model of the concept space.
6.2. Boolean concepts
To evaluate human learning of boolean concepts (the task
from Section 5.3), we sampled ten test concepts, five com-
posed of one property and five composed of two properties.
We recruited 80 subjects on Amazon Mechanical Turk and
showed 40 of them two random positive examples of the
ten concepts and the other 40 of them two examples chosen
by the teacher. They were then asked to classify four new
images as either a part of the concept or not. The four new
images always had two positive examples and two nega-
tive examples for the concept. As shown in Figure 12, the
group that received examples from T performed better with
a mean accuracy of 76%, compared to a mean accuracy of
71% for those that received random examples. This dif-
ference was highly significant with p < 0.001, calculated
using the same procedure described in Section 6.1 from
(Jaeger, 2008).
7. Discussion
What leads the protocols that humans learn to be so different
from the protocols that deep learning models learn? One ex-
planation is that humans have limitations that deep learning
models do not.
We investigated the impact of one limitation: humans cannot
jointly optimize among themselves. We found that switch-
ing to an iterative optimization in which (1) the student
network is trained against examples coming from a non-
pedagogical distribution and then (2) the teacher network is
trained against this fixed student leads to more interpretable
teaching protocols. The intuition behind the approach is
that (1) leads the student to learn an interpretable learn-
ing strategy, which then constrains the teacher to learn an
interpretable teaching strategy in (2).
But this is just one of many possible limitations. For ex-
ample, one reason we believe human students did not learn
concepts as well as the student network (Section 6) is that
humans had a different prior over concepts. In the probabilis-
tic concepts task, humans seemed to believe that the lines
came from a unimodal, rather than bimodal, distribution. In
the boolean concepts task, humans tended to overemphasize
color as a property. It is unrealistic to assume that a teacher
and student have a perfectly matching prior over concepts
or perfect models of each other. An important open ques-
tion is which of these limitations are fundamental for the
emergence of interpretable teaching protocols.
While we carried out our experiments in the setting of teach-
ing via examples, another direction for future work is in-
vestigating how an iterative optimization procedure works
in more complex teaching settings (say teaching through
demonstrations) and in communication tasks more broadly.
Overall, we hope that our work presents a first step towards
understanding the gap between the interpretability of ma-
chine agents and human agents.
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